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T
he Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
scheme represents the main mechanism meant
to remove barriers to intra-ASEAN trade. Its
adoption entails the reduction of intraregional tariffs on
goods, ranging from zero to five percent. For the Philip-
pines, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the increas-
ing globalization (which occurs through trade and foreign
direct investment) pose both risks and opportunities. This
is especially true for the country's automotive industry.
The opportunities would come from the effects of a big-
ger market and liberalization combined with the cost ad-
vantages that automotive firms in the country may offer
whereas the risks would represent the fear that the AFTA-
CEPT plan would precipitate the industry’s total demise
since domestic firms would not be able to compete in a
more liberalized environment.
To have an idea of how the local automotive indus-
try would respond, this Policy Notes issue assesses the
performance and structure of the automotive industry
amidst changing government policies. It also reviews
some of the pressing issues and problems confronting
the industry and examines its prospects with the imple-
mentation of the AFTA-CEPT scheme.
Evaluating industry performance and structure
From the 1970s up to the 1980s, the Philippine
automotive industry developed under a system of protec-
tion, regulation and promotion through high tariffs, local
content scheme, and import restrictions. The imposition
of a high level of tariffs, combined with nontariff barriers,
resulted in an industry which had one of the highest pro-
tection levels in the manufacturing sector. Despite the
complex package of incentives that it received, however,
the local automotive industry failed to promote an effi-
cient industry capable of competing internationally.
In an attempt to correct this, the government imple-
mented a series of liberalization and deregulation poli-
cies starting in 1990 aimed at improving the competi-2
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tiveness of the industry. The reforms resulted in the re-
moval of import restrictions and reduction of tariff duties
on completely knocked down (CKD) parts and on locally
manufactured parts. Almost simultaneously, too, restric-
tions on the number of models that should be available
in the market were removed and entry into previously
closed vehicle segments was opened up. The government
also scheduled the removal of the local content program
by the year 2000. An appeal, however, has been made to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to extend the pro-
gram for another five years.
There are currently 19 operating assemblers regis-
tered with the Board of Investments. Out of these, 12
are assemblers of passenger cars and the remaining ones
are mainly engaged in commercial vehicle assembly.
Nissan and Mitsubishi assemble all four major vehicle
types: passenger cars, Asian utility vehicles (AUVs), light
commercial vehicles (LCVs), and trucks and buses. Toyota
assembles passenger cars, AUVs and LCVs. Columbian
Motors, Francisco Motors, and Isuzu Motors are regis-
tered assemblers of AUVs, LCVs, and trucks/buses. About
half of the registered assemblers are affiliated with Japa-
nese companies either through joint venture or technical
assistance agreements.
The Philippine components sector, meanwhile, con-
sists of some 256 companies distributed as follows: met-
alworking – 48 percent, rubber – 15 percent, seats and
trims – 10 percent, plastics – 9 percent, electrical – 8
percent, and others – 10 percent. By the end of 1999,
total investments in the parts and components industry
amounted to about P27 billion. Total employment was
45,000 workers and exports were valued at around
US$1.1 billion. The bulk of total exports was accounted
for by wiring harnesses, a labor-intensive component.
Major component exports like transmissions and ABS
controls are manufactured by Japanese vehicle assem-
bly firms under the ASEAN Industrial Complementation
(AICO) scheme.1
The bulk of the industry is composed of small firms
with capitalization ranging from P0.5 to P5 million. Most
of these firms operate as mom-and-pop style suppliers
with varying capabilities and some real quality problems.
These firms failed to develop as they have insufficient
capital and technology that are necessary to improve their
products. The large firms with capitalization of more than
P100 million account for only about 7 percent of the in-
dustry. They comprise the major players of the industry
and are the same companies manufacturing parts for
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) car assemblers
and engaged in exporting activities. OEM export sales
are difficult to achieve unless there is a close tie-up with
multinational corporations.
The production of vehicles in the country was grow-
ing steadily from 1991 up to 1996 reaching a level of
137,365 units in 1996, the highest in the history of the
industry. With the increasing liberalization of the indus-
try, the long waiting time for customers’ orders which
characterized the industry for a long period of time finally
ended. As the market was opened to new players, com-
petition came into play. Customers had a wider array of
brands and models to choose from which they could
readily obtain in less than a week after an order was
placed. And with more market players, competition grew
stiffer. Discounts, rebates, easy financing packages and
a host of other promotional gimmicks were provided to
customers.
__________
1The AICO scheme provided an arrangement for the complementary
exchanges of specific products agreed upon by the ASEAN member coun-
tries. This replaced the Brand-to-Brand Complementation (BBC) scheme
for the automotive industry which granted privileges such as tariff prefer-
ences, mandatory sourcing, and local content recognition for participat-
ing countries.
With increasing liberalization of the
industry...the market was opened to new
players and competition came into play.




The industry expected vehicle sales to remain buoy-
ant in 1997. Thus, after 1996, a number of firms in-
vested in new plants to expand their operations in antici-
pation of a continuing domestic vehicle demand as the
purchasing power surpassed the US$1000 GDP per capita
income. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, halted
the growth of the industry. Production by Japanese-affili-
ated firms fell by 16 percent in 1997 and by 50 percent
in 1998 although a slight recovery was felt in 1999 as
production went up by 12 percent (Table 1).
Total vehicle sales were a little over 162,000 units
in 1996. This declined by 11 percent in 1997, 44 per-
cent in 1998 and 7 percent in 1999. Locally produced
vehicles accounted for almost 88 percent or about
142,145 units in 1996 but
the share of imported ve-
hicles to total sales in-
creased moderately from 12
percent in 1996 to 14 per-
cent in 1997. Then this
slightly dropped to 13.6 per-
cent in 1998 and to 9.4 per-
cent in 1999 (Table 2). LCVs
accounted for the bulk of im-
ported vehicles or about 67
percent of the total vehicles imported in 1996 while pas-
senger cars accounted for the remaining 33 percent. In
1999, the share of LCV imports to total vehicle imports
rose to about 77 percent.
Over the last eight years, there have been signifi-
cant changes in consumers’ tastes and preferences. De-
mand for commercial vehicles, for instance, has been
strong as noted in the substantial increases in AUV sales
which more than doubled between 1996 and 1999. The
share of LCVs increased from about 30 percent during
the years 1996-1997 to 32 percent in 1998 and 1999.
The share of passenger cars, on the other hand, declined
from about 55 percent in 1996 to 52 percent in 1997
and then substantially from 43 percent in 1998 to only
37 percent in 1999. The share of trucks and buses,
meanwhile, was almost constant during the years 1996
to 1999.
All the four segments of the vehicle market are highly
concentrated as indicated by the concentration ratio lev-
els. The four-firm concentration ratios (CR4) as indicated
in Table 3 represent the sum of the shares of the top
four firms to total sales. In the passenger car segment,
the industry is shown to be dominated by the big four:
Honda, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Nissan with concentra-
tion ratios rising from 74 percent in 1996 to 81 percent
in 1999. In the LCV segment, the concentration level
declined from 80 percent in 1996 to 76 percent in 1999.
The leaders in this segment are Mitsubishi, Honda, Uni-
versal Motors, and Isuzu. In the AUV segment, there are
only three major competing firms led by Toyota and fol-




Passenger cars 27267 33543 51359 57066 73323 76909 58486 23857 23196
Commercial vehicles* 19741 25356 30843 42280 53693 60456 50830 31287 38507
Total 47008 58899 82202 99346 127016 137365 109316 55144 61703
Source: Data from 1991 to 1996 were from the Board of Investments (BOI). The BOI, however, stopped
compiling the same data after 1996.
Notes: *Commercial vehicles cover pick-ups, vans, buses, trucks and special purpose vehicles.
**Data refer only to Japanese-affiliated companies.
 Table 1. Production of passenger cars and commercial vehicles
Vehicle Type 1996 1997 1998 1999
Passenger cars 88977 75760 34688 27580
% to total 54.89 52.45 43.24 37.06
AUVs 18089 20004 17458 20293
% to total 11.16 13.85 21.76 27.27
LCVs 49673 43506 25602 24165
% to total 30.64 30.12 31.91 32.47
Trucks and buses 5356 5165 2483 2376
% to total 3.30 3.58 3.09 3.19
Total sales 162095 144435 80231 74414
Total imports 19950 20375 10882 6994
% to total 12.31 14.11 13.56 9.40
Source: Chamber of Automotive Manufacturers of the
Philippines, Inc. (CAMPI)




lowed by Mitsubishi and Isuzu. Hence, its concentration
level has remained very high. In the trucks and buses
segment, the leading firms are Mitsubishi, Isuzu, Phil-
Hino, and Columbian. Concentration level in this segment
has also remained high.
Industry leaders Toyota, Mitsubishi, Honda, Nissan,
Pilipinas Hino, and Columbian Motors were consistently
among the top 1000 corporations in the Philippines from
1986 to 1996. During these
years, these companies made
more profits than losses.
What ails the Philippine
automotive industry?
Protection and promotion Protection and promotion
of the industry of the industry
As noted earlier, years of
protection had made the local automotive industry one
of the most protected and consequently led to its inabil-
ity, as a whole, to compete on a global basis.
Are there data or means of evaluation to support
this statement?
The effective protection rate (EPR)2 is the most com-
prehensive measure of protection as it incorporates the
effects of tariffs on both inputs and outputs of a specific
__________
2The EPR measures the net protection on value added received by
an industry. Value added is the margin between the prices of inputs and
outputs. It is within this margin that a domestic manufacturer must pay
wages, rents, and interest on borrowed capital and from which he must
extract his profit. The greater the margin, the more room there is to ac-
commodate higher factor cost. The margin can be increased either by
raising tariffs on competing imports of finished products, lowering tariffs
on imported inputs, or both. This dual effect of the tariff structure is called
effective protection.
3The DRC measure can be interpreted in an ex post sense to repre-
sent the social cost of promoting exports or of protecting import-
substituting industries under an existing policy regime (Bautista et al.
1979). Following Medalla, Tecson, Bautista, and Power (1995), a coun-
try has comparative advantage (disadvantage) in the production of the
industry’s output if the DRC/SER ratio is less (greater) than 1.2.
industry. For instance, the vehicle industry benefits from
the tariffs imposed on imported vehicles (output) but is
penalized by the tariffs on its CKD imports (input).
The domestic resource cost3 (DRC), meanwhile, rep-
resents the ratio of total domestic cost, evaluated at
social opportunity cost, to the net foreign exchange
earned, i.e., world price less foreign cost. The DRC mea-
sure indicates the amount of domestic resources used
per unit of foreign exchange earned or saved from the
production of a tradable good. DRC analysis offers use-
ful insights into the relative efficiency of sectoral invest-
ments and the international competitiveness of domes-
tic industries.
EPR estimates for the years 1983, 1988, and 1994
indicated the high levels of protection enjoyed by the motor
vehicle industry. For all these years, the effective protec-
tion of the industry was always higher than the average
for all the manufacturing sectors. The DRC estimates for
the transport equipment sector indicated economic inef-
ficiencies in terms of saving foreign exchange for all years
of 1983, 1988, and 1994. The results also showed  that
the use of domestic resources by the vehicle assemblers
Industry Segment 1996  1997  1998  1999
Asian utility vehicles 100.00 99.29 96.64 98.00
Passenger cars 74.35 75.00 79.66 81.20
Light commercial vehicles 79.84 82.87 78.93 75.98
Trucks and buses 90.65 91.31 87.64 93.52
Source of basic data: CAMPI sales
Table 3. Four-firm concentration ratios
(in percent)
1983 1988 1994
Transport All Transport All Transport All
Equipment Manufacturing Equipment Manufacturing Equipment Manufacturing
EPR 50.60 42.80 48.80 28.30 57.32 19.17
DRC 2.40 1.72 1.40 1.54 1.88 1.18
Sources: Tecson (1996), Pineda (1997), and Medalla (1998)
Table 4. EPRs and DRCs of transport equipment and total manufacturing5
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was costly compared to their net foreign exchange sav-
ing. On the whole, the DRC results for these years under
study were indicative of  the country’s lack of  compara-
tive advantage in the assembly of motor vehicles. These
results as shown in Table 4 are borne out by the price
comparison outlined in Table 5.
Table 5 compares the production costs of vehicles
assembled in the country to comparable vehicles manu-
factured and assembled in Japan. The data for the years
1994 and 1995 indicated the considerable differences
in the costs of production between the two countries,
with vehicles assembled in the Philippines being more
costly than completely built-up units from Japan. With 41
percent local content, production costs for passenger cars
ran about 3 times those in Japan. For light commercial
vehicles, production costs were in the range of 2.37-2.59
times than those in Japan. At 44 percent local content in
1995, the cost differences even widened, except for pick-
up vans. In 1995, the cost of a passenger car (1.2L) was
3.68 times its Japanese counterpart while the delivery
van was 3.92 times its Japanese equivalent.
Limited domestic market Limited domestic market
A number of studies on the Philippine car assembly
industry showed that the fundamental obstacle to pro-
duction efficiency is the diseconomy of scale associated
with its production oriented towards internal markets of
limited size. The local car market is small compared to
the minimum scales of production required in the indus-
try. Despite the small size of the Philippine market, how-
ever, there are currently 19 companies that are assem-
bling vehicles or producing them under contract for Japa-
nese, Korean, and European manufacturers. As a result,
the average output per assembler is extremely low, with
only eight companies (Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi,
Asian Carmakers, Francisco, Isuzu, and Universal) hav-
ing annual production capacity of above 10,000 units.
Local content requirement Local content requirement
The government’s local content program requires
assembly firms to use 40 percent domestic parts. While
this regulation provides protection to domestic produc-
ers of parts, the effect is somewhat different on the as-
sembly firms that must buy locally. The use of local com-
ponents has entailed a “cost penalty” among car assem-
blers who often must bear the high cost of local inputs,
the inability of some local suppliers to meet product quality
specifications, and the untimely delivery of some local
suppliers. Moreover, the program requires
assemblers to put up their own parts manu-
facturing plants. Thus, Mitsubishi and Toyota
invested in transmission plants, Honda and
Kia constructed engine assembly plants, and
Toyota and Nissan built stamping plants. To
the extent that their exports of parts are not
significant, the assemblers themselves also
contribute to the “cost penalty.”
"A number of studies on the Philippine car
assembly industry showed that the funda-
mental obstacle to production efficiency is
the diseconomy of scale associated with its
production oriented towards internal mar-
kets of limited size."
In an earlier study on automotive parts
manufacturing in the Philippines, Gimenez
(1994) indicated  the slow growth of the parts
Car Type Pd: Ex-Factory Price Pb: Price of Imported Pd/Pb Ratio
Counterpart (Japan)
1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995
Passenger car 1.2L 348,687 389,468 110,500 105,818 3.16 3.68
Passenger car 2.0L 686,995 802,022 231,496 240,558 2.97 3.33
LCV: Aluminum van
(diesel) 2500cc 476,846 616,333 201,623 157,084 2.37 3.92
LCV: Pick-up 2500cc 435,744 499,914 168,564 209,622 2.59 2.38
Source of basic data: The price data were provided by one of the  Japanese vehicle
firms in the industry.
The firm had 41 percent local content in 1994 and 44 percent in 1995.
Table 5. Cost comparison6
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manufacturing industry. The growth in exports was ac-
counted for by a few components such as wiring har-
nesses, transmissions, radiators, aluminum wheels, plas-
tic grills, and rubber hoses. Exports to OEM were limited
to wiring harnesses (accounted for more than 70 per-
cent of all auto parts exports), transmissions, plastic
grills, and radiator hoses. Gimenez concluded that many
of the parts manufactured and supplied to assemblers
are not competitive in terms of both price and quality
due to the following problems:
k lack of locally manufactured raw materials,
thereby having many of the raw materials used by com-
ponents manufacturers imported;
k low productivity and lack of quality measures
among small and medium parts makers;
k old equipment and technology, with many firms
using technologies that are more than 20 years behind;
and
k lack of mold design technology, tool and die mak-
ing.
The local content program is one major element
contributing to the high cost of car assembly in the coun-
try. Local parts constituted between 35 to 43 percent of
total cost in 1995. Except for those parts with signifi-
cant exports, domestic parts are not competitive in terms
of both price and quality. In a study of automotive indus-
tries in India and Latin America, Baranson (1969) noted
that manufacturing cost increases as a function of do-
mestic content. This can be attributed to the high cost of
components and parts which are produced at relatively
low volumes in small-scale plants. The backward linkage
effect generated by assembly plants, which is usually
cited as beneficial, actually gives rise to high-cost ve-
hicle assembly.
Taxation Taxation
Like tariffs, taxes inflate the prices of vehicles
thereby reducing the affordability and demand for both
imported and locally manufactured vehicles. This kind of
disincentive is usually thought appropriate in the case of
private cars. However, in the case of vehicles intended
for productive use, the strategy has been to impose lesser
taxes.
The prices of vehicles in the country have been sub-
stantially affected by the incidence of government tariffs
and taxes. These frequently account for a significant part
of the price paid by the final consumer. A 10 percent
value added tax is imposed on cars. In addition, imported
and domestically assembled cars are subject to a 15-
100 percent excise tax,4 depending on the car’s engine
displacement. The excise tax schedule for the automo-
tive industry is described in Table 6.
The ruling on the imposition of excise taxes on ve-
hicles has been subject to much debate. The disagree-
ment is rooted on the question of why some vehicles are
charged while others, which are evidently more expen-
sive, are not. For instance, smaller and cheaper vehicles
__________
4Excise taxes are internal taxes levied on the manufacture, sale or
consumption of a commodity within the country based on the
manufacturer’s or importer’s selling price, net of excise and value added
tax.
"The local content program is one major el-
ement contributing to the high cost of car
assembly in the country ... Except for those
parts with significant exports, domestic parts
are not competitive in terms of both price
and quality."
Gasoline Diesel Tax  Rate
(cc.) (cc.) (%)
up to 1600 up to 1800 15
1601 to 2000 1801 to 2300 35
2001 to 2700 2301 to 3000 50
2701 and over 3001 and over 100
Source: National Internal Revenue Code,
Chapter VI, Title VI
Table 6. Structure of excise taxes7
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are subject to taxes while bigger luxury vehicles are not.
LCVs with seating capacity of less than 10 persons (in-
cluding driver) are subject to tax whereas commercial
vehicles able to seat more than nine are not. AUVs, pick-
ups, vans, sport utility vehicles (SUVs) as well as trucks
and buses are likewise exempted from excise taxes. The
regulation exempts all vehicles designed for the trans-
port of goods as well as those with seating capacity of
more than nine passengers (including driver). Thus large
SUVs like the Mitsubishi Pajero, which carry more than
nine passengers, were exempted from excise taxes while
small SUVs, like the Honda CR-V, were subject to excise
taxes based on their engine classification. There have
also been complaints against increasingly higher-priced
AUVs, pick-ups, vans and trucks enjoying excise tax ex-
emptions. Some assemblers just added rear seats to
avail of the tax exemption.
In view of these issues, the government decided to
impose excise taxes on full-sized SUVs and AUVs. Effec-
tive February 2000, all SUVs, which are defined as 4-
wheel drive vehicles, regardless of seating capacity, are
already taxable. Some assemblers reacted to this new
tax policy by introducing 4x2 variants of their SUVs and
pick-ups since said models remain to be tax exempt.
Accordingly, then, beginning in August 2000, the govern-
ment announced that it would likewise impose excise
taxes on AUVs. Thus, AUVs are now covered by a 15-
percent excise tax. However, while the industry recog-
nizes the need for the government to increase revenue,
it argues that this new tax measure will restrain the de-
mand for AUVs and will run counter to the objective of
encouraging the use of low-cost vehicles. Moreover, the
automotive industry claims that the popularity of AUVs
is due to their multi-purpose use and identifying whether
the vehicle is intended for
commercial or private use
is very cumbersome. There
is, therefore, a need to
evaluate the overall effi-
ciency gains from imple-
menting the proposed tax
changes vis-à-vis the current
excise tax structure and the impact on affordability and
domestic demand.
Surviving the implementation of AFTA-CEPT
The adoption of the AFTA-CEPT scheme would re-
sult into a very low and almost uniform tariff structure
ranging from zero to five percent. This will substantially
reduce effective protection in the automotive industry. It
will also allow the entry of relatively cheaper imports which
is expected to heighten competition in the industry. To
survive, domestic firms must work doubly hard to
strengthen their competitiveness in anticipation of the
day when no protection at all will be in place. This would
require improvements in efficiency and productivity of both
domestic assemblers and parts manufacturers, reduc-
tion in production costs (particularly for raw materials
cost which account for a major percentage of motor ve-
hicle costs), and expansion of market size (by exporting
or reducing the number of models and plants serving the
domestic market) to achieve economies of scale.
The implementation of AFTA and the increasing glo-
balization that has characterized the industry would defi-
nitely imply short-run adjustment costs as the new liber-
alized environment would affect firms differently. The ef-
ficient ones would prosper while those which remain in-
efficient would fail.
In this regard, there are several options open to
the industry, to wit:
k continue CKD operations and focus on their big-
gest selling model and export;
k engage in completely built up (CBU) operations,
that is, import and engage in vehicle trading activities
"The implementation of AFTA and the increasing globalization that
has characterized the industry would definitely imply short-run ad-
justment costs as the new liberalized environment would affect firms
differently. The efficient ones would prosper while those which re-
main inefficient would fail."8
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(the problem here, though, is what to do with their as-
sembly facilities especially those that were newly con-
structed);
k concentrate in manufacturing components and
parts to be sold in both the domestic and foreign mar-
kets; and
k engage in providing vehicle service and repair.
All the Japanese firms interviewed5 are still waiting
for specific instructions from their parent companies. The
firms are aware of the different options that are avail-
able to them. They all want to be able to export CBUs
and have a fairly good idea of what their overall strategy
would most likely be. However, the details would have to
come from their parent companies.
Honda, for example, would strengthen its competi-
tiveness and would focus on the ASEAN market. The com-
pany does not seem to have definite plans yet on the
type of cars or specific models to be exported in the
region. They want to wait and see what happens if AFTA
goes ahead.
Mitsubishi Motors is preparing for AFTA by reducing
its production costs, albeit with limited success. The com-
pany would like to focus on its big volume vehicle model—
AUVs—and continue to manufacture Lancer passenger
cars. The company sees the current situation as a very
fluid one and views the future with uncertainty. If its con-
tinued operations would not be feasible once the AFTA
goes through, the company plans to engage in trading
activities by importing CBUs.
Toyota hopes to be able to develop a particular
model that is unique to the country. One possibility would
be for Toyota Philippines to develop the left-hand drive
AUVs. Indonesia is currently manufacturing the right-hand
drive AUV and would most likely be the production base
for RHD AUVs. Thailand would be the production base for
pick-up trucks and Malaysia for passenger cars given its
relatively huge market and the government support to
develop a national car. Toyota would continue to export
car parts, where the Philippines’ competitive edge seems
to be. Toyota expects to generate an increased demand
for these products once AFTA is implemented. While there
are still uncertainties as to what vehicle type or models
and what vehicle parts to produce, Toyota is flexible
enough to face AFTA.
Meanwhile, Nissan indicated that the implementa-
tion of AFTA would make it more difficult for the company
to compete. Nissan knows that the AFTA represents a
larger, open market where anybody can come in and bring
in any vehicle model. This situation is expected to give
rise to stiffer competition. There are no clear directions
yet on how the company plans to address the future com-
petition arising from AFTA. It is still waiting for specific
instructions from its mother company in Japan on its role
in the global operations. While the AFTA would be benefi-
cial to consumers, Nissan is worried about increasing
unemployment and investment losses for domestic ve-
hicle assemblers and their suppliers.
Finally, Ford seems to have assigned its Philippine
plant to supply the small cars in the region. It is thus
confident that Ford would be ready to compete once AFTA
goes ahead.
Note that the firms’ detailed strategies are affected
by a number of factors, including the following:
k strategies of their parent companies;
k differences in consumer demand for vehicle be-
tween the Philippines and other ASEAN markets; and
k competitiveness of the Philippine motor vehicle
industry.
Can the industry make it?
Current export figures indicate that the Philippine
automotive industry is not yet globally competitive. It is
evident from Table 7 that as of 1998, there were only
two domestic firms, Nissan and Nissan Diesel, that were
able to export CBUs. Nissan exported 120 units of Cefiro
__________
5Top executives from Toyota, Honda, Mitsubishi, Nissan and new-




to Taiwan and 300 units of AD Resort to Syria while Nissan
Diesel exported 71 large buses to Japan and China.
In contrast, during the same year, Mitsubishi Thai-
land exported 59,023 CBUs (one-ton pickup trucks),
2,930 CKD units (pickup), and 1720 units of passenger
cars. Hino Thailand exported 18 CBUs of GH model while
Mazda Thailand exported 1,855 commercial vehicles to
Australia and New Zealand. Daihatsu Indonesia exported
79 CBUs commercial vehicles and 280 CKD units com-
mercial vehicles. Indonesia’s exports of Toyota Kijang
amounted to 374 CBUs and 7,690 CKD units. In Malay-
sia, exports of passenger cars reached 25,280 units in
1997 and 20,484 units in 1998.
To survive the five percent tariff regime, domestic
assemblers and components manufacturing firms will
have to bring down their production costs in line with the
costs and quality of others. It is only by operating at an
efficient scale and exporting successfully that the auto-
motive industry may be sustainable in the future.
As changes in the international trading scene con-
tinue, the Philippine automotive industry will have to evolve
further if it is to be competitive in a global context. As an
initial step, it is necessary to reduce tariff protection and
remove the local content program in order to create a
competitive domestic market. This will put pressure on
domestic firms to continue efforts to improve their per-
formance, reduce costs and increase productivity. It is
only by doing so that firms will have a chance in compet-
ing in a global industry. Delaying the reforms would sim-
ply delay the realization of potential benefits. Firms which
ask the government to postpone the reforms and retain
tariff protection to enable them to compete have very
little prospect of exporting successfully. Delaying the re-
forms is not a guarantee that these firms would become
internationally competitive.
For the parts and components sector which is domi-
nated by the small and medium enterprises (SMEs), it is
necessary for the companies to abandon their mom-and-
pop style of operations. For them to develop and improve
their products, their access to capital and technology be-
comes crucial. While this poses a real problem to the
sector, it does not justify the continuation of the local
content program which has failed in the past to promote
the growth and development of SMEs. Moreover, with or
without the local content requirement, domestic assem-
blers would source their
parts and components lo-
cally, provided that these
are available at prices and
quality at par with their im-
ported counterparts.
"As changes in the international trading scene continue, the Philip-
pine automotive industry will have to evolve further if it is to be com-
petitive in a global context. As an initial step, it is necessary to reduce
tariff protection and remove the local content program in order to
create a competitive domestic market."
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Indonesia
Passenger cars - - - - 3
Commercial vehicles 4333 5663 5890 5451 8455
Total 4333 5663 5890 5451 8458
Thailand
Passenger cars 1202 - - 980 6942
Commercial vehicles 6981 7190 14260 40655 64607
Total 8183 7190 14260 41635 71549
Malaysia
Passenger cars 15000 20800 21900 25280 20484
Commercial vehicles 16 149 92 234 277
Total 15016 20949 21992 25514 20761
Philippines
Passenger cars - - - - 120
Commercial vehicles 12 18 18 47 376
Total 12 18 18 47 496
Source: Japanese Automakers’ Cooperative Assistance (JAMA), 1999.
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Conclusion
The key to improving the competitiveness of the
Philippine automotive industry lies in its ability to reduce
total production costs, improve its efficiency and produc-
tivity, and expand its market size. To survive, automotive
firms must operate at an efficient scale and export suc-
cessfully. Without changes in their cost competitiveness
and market orientation, the chances of the industry in
competing globally might be limited.
Government policy is only one of the many variables
affecting the future structure of the industry. The govern-
ment must provide a stable industry policy so that firms
can set their targets and plan their investments in the
light of market opportunities. The removal of the local
content program must be implemented as planned and
tariff reduction must continue to take place if the indus-
try is to achieve its full potential in the face of global
competition. Recent inconsistencies in implementing the
rules on SKD importation as well as on excise taxes, for
instance, must be avoided in the future.  4 4
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